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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

OSBORNE ALLEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 7'672

ROSE PARK PHARMACY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPOND·ENT

STATEMENT ·OF THE FACTS
Because the statement of facts as set forth in
appellant's brief is not all inclusive, it is respondent's
desire to apprise the court of certain facts he deems
important that have been excluded from appellant's
brief.
In the early f.all of 1949 plaintiff approached the
owners of defendant corporation about going to work
for them as a pharmacist and manager of their new
drugstore and pharmacy at 4th North and Oakley
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Streets (between 11th and 12th West) in Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R. 31) Negotiations ripened into an agreement whereby plaintiff was to manage the store .and
share in the net profits and thereby acquire stock in
the corporation to the extent of 25o/o ownership. (R. 34)
Meantime plaintiff was working as a pharmacist for
W algreens, but immediately proceeded to work for
defendant in his off-hours in helping the Geurts brothers,
the owners of the defendant corporation, purchase
equipment, supplies and merchandise for the new store.
This he did for a period of four or five weeks before
he was put on defendant's payroll, which occurred
November 18, 1949. At the same time he was terminated at Walgreens. Undenied is plaintiff's testimony
that:
''. . . I went out 100% to help these fello·ws.
I didn't insist on receiving any salary for this
at all because my whole heart was in the store.
So I put in all this time with Ted without receiving any pay to the time I terminated from Walgreens. . . . '' (R. 34 & 35)
According to plaintiff's testimony it was not until
after Christmas, over two months from the time he
started to work f.or defendant, that the Geurts brothers
presented him with a copy of the written contract to
sign, which included a provision permitting defendant
to terminate the contract without cause on 30 days
notice, and the following negative covenant:
"8. ~Osborne ~agrees that in the event of
termination of this contract for any reason, he
shall fully account for all funds, inventory, assets
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and equipment and hP shall not direetly or indirertly eon1pete, as an en1ployee or principal,
in the operation of a drug store or pharmacy
"\Yithin a radius of t\YO miles of this drug store
for a period of fiye years thereafter. Breach
or threatened breach of the tern1s of employment
shall entitle this Pharmacy to injunctive relief
in addition to other ren1edies." (R. 5 & 6)
There had been no discussion of these provisions 'vi th
plaintiff before this time, and, of course, having already given up his employment at Walgreens, and
'Yorked for defendant for over two months, he signed
the contract. (R. 35 & 36)
Plaintiff employed his wife, and together they
worked sixteen to eighteen hours a day in order to
build up the business which grew to a ''fairly good
volume". (R. 36 & 37) Plaintiff and his wife lived
near the drug store and had many friends and neighbors who patronized the store because of their close
friendship. (R. 38) Plaintiff's employment continued
for about a year when on November 14, 1950, plaintiff
was served with a notice of termination. (R. 44 & 45)
There was no explanation or allegation of cause for
termination, and, in fact, defendant's officers gave
plaintiff an excellent letter of recommendation and a
good "pat on the back". (R. 46)
Plaintiff brought this action asking the court to
declare that the negative covenant in the contract was
unenforceable. At the trial plaintiff introduced in evidence as exhibit "A" a map of Salt Lake City with a
circle drawn in red to denote the two-mile area and
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showing the locations of the defendant's drugstore
and all other drugstores within the area. (R. 27) This
evidence and plaintiff's testimony regarding it indicated there were eight other drugstores operating
within the area during the time plaintiff continued in
employment with defendant. (R. 40)
Concerning the territory over which the defendant's business extended plaintiff testified as follows:
"Q (By Mr.· Richards). Can you tell us the
greatest distance to which you and your employees delivered prescriptions~
''A. Yes, I can give a fairly reasonable distance on that simply because I was doing the
majority of delivering, and I was using my own
car on that because I remember, and I can
go by our prescription business, because the
majority of our prescriptions have the patients'
address. The furthest east on prescriptions, and
there was one only, was at Second West ·and
North Temple.
''Q. How did you come to deliver that~
"A. I went up at about twelve-thirty in the
morning, and the doctor had called me, and the
store was closed, and asked me if I would send
up the prescription to him. The doctor that
called there was a very close friend of mine,
and he was giving me his prescription volume
for that reason. He asked me if I would take it
up to them, and it was Dr. Harvey Moore.
"Q. Would you say that you delivered many
prescriptions east of Eighth West~
''A. The prescription volume which we were
doing out there was mostly pediatric work, children, simply because the prescription volume
was coming from just about Rose Park people.
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do you know that~
"· . A.. Because the type of pre~eription. y· ou
can tell \Yhether it i8 for a child or an adult,
and from the type of physician that calls, and
also because of the thiekly populated area In
Rose Park for children.
~ 'Q.
Can you tell from the addresses~
'• . .\.
.
I \Yould say that the volume of our
prescription business ''Tas located in Rose Park
proper.
'' Q. Specify please, if you can, were many
prescriptions delivered east of Eighth West~
'• A. , . .ery few east of Eighth West.
~ 'Q. \\-.-ere very many delivered south of
X orth Temple~
~ ' . .\. Why, I remember delivering one out
there in a late evening on the same call for
Dr. :\Ioore. I went down as low as Ninth South
on one of them, one only.
"Q. One only~
''A. Yes.
"Q. Would that be the only prescription
south of North Temple that you delivered~
"A. To my knowledge, yes." (R. 39-40)

"'Q.

Ho"~

With respect to the profits in the new business
plaintiff gave the following testimony:
''Q (By Mr. Richards). Now, did you notice
any appreciable increase in the volume of prescriptions during the time you were there~
''A. Yes, our opening day we had three
prescriptions on record. At the time of termination we had filled 5,248 new prescriptions,
1,7 40 refills, a total of 6,988 prescriptions. And
that figured out for thE;i number of days that I
had worked in this drug store, 20.6 prescriptions per day.
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"Q. That is an average over the whole year~
"A. That is an average at the time I was
employed, from the time of first employment
until the time of termination.
'' Q. Do you have any idea of the average
number of prescriptions the last month of your
employment per day, the number per day~
''A. It would be a greater percentage than
this because naturally your business just builds
up as you go along. So for an average of
twenty prescriptions for the last month of operation, I imagine, the prescriptions would average up around thirty or forty. That is including new prescriptions and refills.
'' Q. You stated awhile ago that the drug
store operated at a loss, I believe, the first
few months.
''A. When we took our first inventory which
was in June, Martell and I worked very closely
together.
' 'Q. Who is Martell~
''A. Martell was employed as a bookkeeper.
I managed the drug store.

* * *
"Q. Did you have discussions with him with
respect to the profits and loss and increase and
decrease in business, etc. ~
''A. Yes, discussions and reports.
'' Q. What were those discussions~
"MR. PuGsLEY: We object to that as hearsay.
''THE CouRT : I don't know that it would be
hearsay, but it might not be the best evidence.
You are trying to show whether the company
operated at a profit. They would be entitled to
see the Profit and Loss Statement.
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· · Q (By ~lr. Richards). Did you see the
Profit and Loss Statement'?
· '_..:\... Yes. ~ ot only sa"T then1, but I was given
a record of the report. Those \Yere given out
to Theodore, \\. .illiam T. Geurts, and myself.
Three reports \Yere n1ade out.
Q. \\'hat did they sho\Y generally for the
first fe\v n1onths ·?
-' .._-\.. They shovved \Ye operated at a loss for
the first six months.
'' Q. \\. .hen did they begin showing a profit~
'~ ~IR. PrGSLEY: \Y- e object to that as immaterial.
' ·THE Co-c-RT : Overruled.
'' .._-\.. They showed a profit from the July
statement on.
"Q (By Mr. Richards). Was that considerable profit~
"A. It was substantial profit, enough so
that if the store continued on that operation it
would show an overall profit for the year, taking care of the first six months' loss.'' (R. 41-43)
H

At the conclusion of the trial the court announced
its decision in favor of the plaintiff as set f.orth in
appellant's brief and made findings to the effect that
there was no proper consideration to support the plaintiff's negative covenant, that the 30 days notice was
too short a period to constitute mutuality of obligaion to support said covenant and was an unreasonable restraint of trade. The court found further
that although the five-year period of non-competition
was reasonable, the interdicted area described by a
two-mile radius was unreasonable, and that plaintiff
while working for defendant had acquired nothing in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

the nature of trade secrets. (R. 15-16) Appellant designates these findings and the court's judgment declaring
paragraph 8 of the contract unenforceable as points
of error. (R. 19-20)

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS UNREASONABLE
WITH RESPECT To· SPACE.

II.
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY A PROPER CONSIDERATION NOR WAS THERE
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION.

III.
IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO CASES CITED BY
APPELLANT PLAINTIFF HEREIN ACQUIRED NO TRADE
SECRETS.

IV.
THE QUESTION OF ESTO·PPEL CANNOT FIRST BE
RAISED ON APPEAL.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS UNREASONABLE
WITH RESPECT TO SPACE.

It was once generally the law of England that
all contracts containing negative covenants of the sort
in plaintiff's contract of employ:ment were invalid and
unenforceable as against public policy. Every man
had the right to work, and to restrict him in any
degree was to limit his ability to gain a livelihood,
which meant that he and his dependents may become
public charges. As communication and transportation
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has beco1ne Inore available and as men have become
more educated and trained and more flexible in their
ability to engage in more than one trade, the law has
relaxed son1ewhat in favor of the principle of freedom
of contract. See ''i"illiston on Contracts, Revised Edition, \"" olun1e 3, page 4578, Section 1635. The law is
relaxed to that point that as long as the restraint in
length of time and area of space is reasonable the
negative covenant is enforceable and valid, but if the
restrictions are more than are necessary to the reasonable protection of the employer, or if they are unduly
oppressive to the employee courts of equity have
refused to enforce them by injunctions.
There is a great field of law on the subject, and
the cases, of course, go both ways depending upon the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In W isconsin Ice ~ Coal Co. v. Lueth, et al. (1933), 213 Wis.
4:2, 250 N.v\r. 819 plaintiff employed defendant to
deliver ice and solicit business with a negative covenant from the defendant not, for a period of two
years after leaving the employ of plaintiff, to deliver
ice or solicit business either on behalf of himself or
any other person or company, in a certain territory
in the city of Milwaukee, which territory was specifically and particularly set forth in the contract by
its streets boundaries. The court found that the defendant voluntarily quit the plaintiff's employ. It was
held that in spite of this fact, and because of the
unreasonableness of the restrictions the contract was
unenforceable. The court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''So, in the case of the employee, the restrictive covenant must bear some relation to the
activities of the employee. It must not restrain
his activities in a territory into which his former work has not taken him or given him the
opportunity to enjoy undue advantages in later
competition :with his employer.''

"* * * * The principal difficulty arising, however, where the contract of employment containing the restrictive covenant initiates the relation
of employer and employee. There the employee,
at the time of executing the contract, has as yet
no established route which will form a reasonable
limit to the scope of the restrictive covenant.
He may be assigned to work at any place within
the territory actively canvassed by his employer.
May the employer, in such a situation, designate
a territory less than the entire territory covered
by its business but greater than that which will
be worked at any one time by the employee, and
perhaps greater than ever will be worked by the
employee during the Gourse of his employment,
and d~signate this territory as that to which the
noncompeting agreement is applicable~ There
is no question, from an examination of the record, that the territory described in the contract
here involved is more extensive than that in
which defendant worked for the Kilbourn Company. It is larger than that in which defendant,
subsequent to the making of the contract, worked
for the plaintiff; in fact, it was large enough,
'according to the evidence, to be cared for by
some forty-five drivers, and larger than the
defendant could work, unless his employment for
the plaintiff extended over a very long period
of time."
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Plaintiff in the principle case testified that the
interdicted area extends \Yay beyond the trade area of
defendant drug·store. The ronrt in the \V'isconsin case
concludes:
··It is our conclusion that this restriction
,,~as broader than \Yas called for by the necessities of the case, and that, while the contract
might in other respects be proper and valid, it
cannot be enforced.
''For the foregoing reasons it follows that
the judgment must be reversed.''
L

The court refused to grant an injunction in The
Sanznel Stores v. Abranzs (1919), 94 Conn. 248, 108 A.
541, 9 ..._\.L.R. 1450, restraining the defendant from
engaging in a business similar to that of plaintiff
not\vithstanding defendant had previously entered into
an employment agreement with plaintiff in November
of 1918, agreeing not to so engage in such business
directly or indirectly for 5 years after the termination
of his employment, and who on December of the same
year voluntarily quit his employment with the plaintiff to so enter and engage in the same business and
in the same city where plaintiff operated a store. The
court in discussing the difference between restrictive
covenants in connection with employment contract and
restrictive covenants ancillary to sale of business contracts, makes the following observation:
"Under the law, restrictive stipulations in
agreements between employer and employee are
not viewed with the same indulgence as such
stipulations between a vendor and vendee of a
business and its good will.
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''In the latter case, the restrictions add to
the value of what the vendor wishes to sell,
and also add to the value of what the vendee purchases. In such cases also the parties are presumably more nearly on a parity in ability to
negotiation of agreement between employer and
employee''
''The reasonable and fair protection of the
plaintiff's business does not require such an
extended restriction of the defendant's field of
employment. Public policy requires that the defendant's liberty of action in trading or employment shall not be unduly restricted. To enforce
the sweeping terms of this restriction would be
a useless, unnecessary, and undue curtailment
of the defendant's liberty of trading and employment, and an unjustified restraint on competition."
There appears an extensive annotation to the
Samuel Stores case in 9 A.L.R. 1456 concerning restrictive covenants in employment contracts. It is apparent
from this annotation that the law is fairly well
settled to the effect that the enforceability of these
covenants depends upon the reasonableness of the
terms of the covenant as to time and space. A general
statement of the law as found at page 1467 reads as
follows:
"The validity of such contracts, however, is
more directly presented in the second class of
cases, i.e., covenant by the employee not to engage for himself or for others in a competing
business for a definite period of time, and generally within certain prescribed boundaries. The
denial of relief for the breach of such covenants
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is generally based upon the ground, either that
the contract is violative of public policy and
hence inYalid, that there is an adequate remedy
at lR\V, or that the contract is oppressive and
imposes undue hardship upon the employee.
\\~hile the san1e general principles of law apply to
covenants of the latter class that apply to sirnilar covenants ancillary to the sale of a business,
nevertheless covenants of this kind by en1ployees
are more carefully scrutinized by the courts,
and relief more readily denied, since the courts,
generally, realize that a too ready enforcement
of them may result in depriving the covenantor
of the means of livelihood, and perchance cause
him to become a charge upon the public.''
There are many cases cited in this annotation and
rn result they run about fifty-fifty-half of them hold
the covenants reaso:o.able and enforceable and the other
half hold them unreasonable and unenforceable. This
indicates that each case must be decided upon its own
facts. This annotation has been supplemented in 20
A.L.R. 1363, 67 A.L.R. 1002, and 98 A.L.R. 963. Each
citing many new cases considering this problem.
In Herreshoff v. Boutineau (1890), 17 R.I. 3, 8
L.R.A. 469, 33 Am. St. Rep. 850, 19 Atl. 712, the defendant employee took a position in a school of languages as a teacher of French and German for a
period of 6 months. In contracting for this employ-,
ment, he agreed not to teach French or German in the
State of Rhode Island during one year after the end
of his employment. At the end of employment he proceeded to teach these languages in the city of Providence
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1n violation of the contract. In holding the contract
unenforceable, the court makes the following observations:
''Is the contract unreasonable~ Courts should
be slow to set aside as unreasonable a restriction which has formed a part of the consideration of a contract; yet, when it is a restriction
upon individual and common rights, which only
oppresses one party without benefiting the other,
all courts agree that it should not be enforced."
''In many undertakings, with modern methods
of advertising and facilities for ordering by telegraph or mail, and sending goods by railroad
or express, it would matter little whether one
was located at Providence or Boston or some
other place. In such cases a restriction embracing the state, or even a larger territory, could
not be said on that account to be unreasonable;
for without it the seller might immediately destroy the value of what he sold and was paid
for. But it is unreasonable to ask courts to enforce a greater restriction than is needed. So
it has been uniformly held that restrictions which
go too far are void. As was said in the note of
the Law Quarterly Review, above cited: 'Covenan tees desiring the maximum of protection
have, no doubt, a difficult task. When they fail,
it is commonly because, like the dog in the fable,
they grasp at too much, and so lost all.'
''In the present case, we think the restriction is unreasonable. Not as a rule of law because it extends throughout the state, but becau,se it extends beyond any apparently necessary protection which the comp.Zaintarnt might
reasonably require, and thus, without benefiting
him, it oppresses the respondent, and deprives
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people in other places of the clHutce 1rh ich 'Jnigh t
be offered the1n to learn the 1 reuch and Ge'l·;;utn
lang.;t,ages of the respondent." (Italics by respondent)
11

Fron1 the above annotation in 9 ..c\.L.R. is taken the
follo,ving comment at page 1477:

··In Pearks v. Cullen

(191~),

28 Times L. R.
(Eng.) 371, the court refused to restrain the
breach of a covenant by a shop assistant not,
for tw·o years after termination of his contract of employment, to engage in a similar
business within 2 miles of the place of employment, or to solicit from any of the customers of
his employer. This covenant \vas held not reasonably necess~ry for the protection of the employer's business, it appearing that clauses of
this character were unusual, and not necessary for protection against shop assistants.
The \vriter does not have available the original report of Pearks v. Cullen, and is therefore unable to
give any more facts about the case.
In a leading English case, Atwood v. LaMont
(1920), 3 K.B. (Eng.) 571, the plaintiff carried on a
business as a draper, tailor, and general outfitter. When
he employed the defendant, the defendant agreed that
upon the termination of his employment, he would
never engage in the trades of tailor, dressmaker, general draper, millinery, hatter, habber dasher, etc. etc.,
at any place within a radius of 10 miles of the plaintiff's store, nor to trade with any persons within that
radius in opposition to the plaintiff. After working
for the plaintiff as a tailor for 10 years, defendant left
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
the plaintiff's employ and engaged in the tailoring
business outside the 10 mile radius but served customers
from within the 10 mile radius and who were previously
customers of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining this trade and the court held that
the contract was in restraint of trade and unenforceable. Younger, L. J., discussed among others three
points in connection with this problem. First, that the
covenantee has the burden of proving that the restricion goes no further than is reasonable for the protection of his business. Second, that the restraint must
also be reasonable so far as the restriction upon the
employee is concerned. That it must not be unduly
oppressive to the employee. Thirdly, he explains the
distinction in the law between the ca.se of a covenant
ancillary to the sale of a business and the case of a
covenant by an employee as follows:
"There are at least two reasons for this distinction. An employer may not, after his servant has left his employment, prevent that servant from using his own skill and knowledge in
his trade or profession, even if acquired when
in the employer's service. That skill and knowledge are only placed at the employer's disposal
during the employment. They have not been
made a subject of sale after that employment
has ceased. ' '
''Accordingly covenants against competition
by a former servant are as such not upheld;
and the permissible extent of any covenant imposed upon a servant must be tested in every
case with reference to the character of the work
done for the employer by the servant while in
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his service and by the consideration whether in
that vie\Y the covenant taken fron1 him goes
further than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the proprietary rights of the eovenantee. "·The reason, and the only reason,''
says Lord Parker in nlorris v. Saxelby (3) 'for
upholding such a restraint on the part of an employee is that the employer has some priorietary
right, \Yhether in the nature of trade connection
or in the nature of trade secrets, for the protection of \Yhich such a restraint is-having regard to the duties of the employee-reasonably
necessary. Such a restraint has, so far as I
know, never been upheld, if directed only to the
prevention of competition or against the use of
the personal skill and knowledge acquired by
the employee in his employer's business.'''
In Kadis t·. Britt (1944), 224 N.C. 154, 29 S. E. 2d
543, 152 A.L.R. 405, plaintiff was engaged in the clothing store business. Defendant had been employed for
years as a delivery man and bill collector. After years
of employment defendant entered into a contract with
plaintiff \Yhereby plaintiff could terminate plaintiff'~
services anytime and defendant was restricted from competing in the county or any adjoining county for 2
years following the termination. After two more years
plaintiff fired the defendant; and when the defendant
vvent to work in a similar establishment plaintiff brought
an injunction. In denying the injunction the court said,
''The restrictive negative covenant in a contract ·of this sort, to be legally effective, must be
ancillary to a valid affirmative covenant, and
examination by the court is necessarily directed
to the substance and validity of this covenant.
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When the contract is defective for want of legally protectible subject or because its practical
effect is merely to stifle normal competition, it
is as much offensive to public policy as it ever
was in promoting monoply at the public expense and is bad. Hence, the trend of discriminating decision is away from the latitude by
which contracts in restraint of employment have
been upheld almost as a matter of course, or
upon a merely plausible showing of some
shadowy right to which the negative covenant
is ancillary. The grave consequences of unemployment demand that the principle affirmative
p-romise, and its basis or subject be examined
and weigh ted with care. ' '
Defendant at the trial failed to sustain the burden
of showing the reasonableness of plaintiff's negative
covenant, and it would have to have accomplished that
before the court could have found for the defendant.
The cases clearly place this burd~n on the covenantee.
Roy v. Bold!uc (1943), 140 Me. 103, 34 Atl. 2d 479, 149
A.L.R. 630, 633, Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Ma.son, 217
Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295, 52 A.L.R. 1344. In the Kadis v.
Britt case, supra, the court placed this burden squarely
upon the covenantee. Quoting from 17 CJS, Contracts,
sec. 240, the court said:
'' .... Contracts in partial restraint of trade
do not escape the condemnation of public policy
unless they possess qualifying conditions which
bring them within that exception. They are still
contrary to public policy and void ''if nothing
shows them to be reasonable.' Benjamin on Sale,
7th Ed, p 535 ; id., p 538, quoting Tindal, C. J. in
Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 743. They must be
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~npported

under the rule \Yhich plaees the burden upon those \Yho \Yould nYnil themselves of
an exeeption-nt least to the extPnt that their
reasonablene~s n1ust be Inade to appear.''
. A_s a coneluding re~ume of the la\Y with respect to
the enforceability of negative eovenants the terms of
·which are unreasonable sections from Corpus Juris
Seeundu1n and the Restatement are quoted herein.

17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 254, page 636.
''Restrictive covenants contained in a contract of hiring are tested by the same standard
of reasonableness of the restraint as are similar
covenants in a contract of sale, but covenants
of the former sort are not viewed by the courts
with the same indulgence, and a smaller scope
for restraint is permitted.
''Generally, while one may not be restrained
from follo,Ying all vocations for which he is
fitted, or from doing productive work useful to
the community, it is the rule in the absence of
contrary statute, that agreements by which an
employee as part of his contract of employment
undertakes not to enter into a competing business on leaving his employer's service are sustained if they are not wider than reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer's
business, and do not impose undue hardship on
the employee, due regard being had to the interests of the public. Under this rule contracts
have frequently been upheld whereby salesmen, agents, canvassers, and other employees
who come into personal contact with their employer's customers agree not to engage in a
competing business within a limited time or
area after leaving their employer's service. The
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restraint imposed by contracts of this cha.racter,
however, is invalid if w·ider than reasonably required for the protection of the employer's business.'' (Italics by respondent)
Restatement of Contracts, Volume 2, page
987, Sec. 514.
''A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in
the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or economic justification, if it
(a) is greater than is required for the
protection of the person for whose benefit the
restraint is imposed, or
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted, or
(c) tends to create, or has for its purpose
to create, a monopoly, or to control prices or to
limit production artificially or
(d) unreasonably restricts the alienation or
use of anything that is a subject of property, or
(e) is based on a promise to refrain from
competition and is not ancillary either to a contract for the transfer of good-will or other subject of property or to an existing employment
or contract of employment."

II.
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY A PROPER CONSIDERATION NOR WAS THERE
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION.

The lower court's theory with respect to this point
is that defendant's promise to employ plaintiff for an
indefinite length of time, terminable at the will of the
defendant, is not adequate consideration to support
plaintiff's negative covenant and that the said
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coYenant cannot be enforced ·a.t la,Y, nor can it
be enforced in equity because there is a lack of
n1utuality of obligation. l~lnintiff eould have "·orked
for defendant one day and defendant under this contract could have tern1inated the employment. Certainly
such execution of defendant's promise could not have
justified enforcement of plaintiff's promise not to compete 'vithin a t\vo mile radius for a period of five years.
The fact that he "\vorked for a year doesn't change the
result that an employment contract terminable at the
will of the employer is not an adequate consideration
or mutual obligation to support the employee's negative covenant. In fact in this particul~ar case, that
he \vas terminated after only one year of employment
is one of the elements that makes this negative covenant not to compete for five years invalid and unenforceable. It vvill be pointed ou~ below that many cases
cited by appellant can be distinguished on this ground.
In Schneller v. Hayes (1934), Wash. 115, 28 Pac. 2d
273, the plaintiff, an optician, employed defendant who
brought his family from Montana to Walla Walla,
Washington to accept said employment, on a week to
week arrangement at $35.00 11111Veek. Defendant agreed
to a restrictive covenant prohibiting him from competing in Walia Walia and one mile outside. The court
held the covenant unenforceable as unreasonable and
against public policy and also as not being supported
by sufficient consideration and refused an injunction.
When insufficiency of consideration was argued because of lack of mutuality, it was suggested that exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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perience and training gained by defendant during the
employment was consideration for the negative covenant. The court said:
''He, (the defendant) was a licensed optician,
employed by a large optical organization, and
presumably was thought competent for employment by appellant. There is no suggestion that
he entered upon an apprenticeship.''
The court discussed the difference between enforcing
these covenants in law and in equity, and cited Me.uer
Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin (C.C.A.), 1 Fed. 2d 687, in
which it is stated:
''If, for instance, an entirely valid contract
contain a provision for its termination by one
party on notice to the other, though enforceable
at law, courts of equity will not, because of such
provision, enforce it by granting equitable relief,
as specific performance, but will leave the aggrieved party to his remedy .at law. This is because the court will not grant equitable relief on
a contract where one party can nullify its action
by exercising his reserved power to terminate it. ''
The Meuer Steel Barrel case, though it involved the
question ·of mutuality of obligation because of a bilateral executory contract terminable at will of one of
the parties, did not involve a negative covenant ancillary to an employment contract as did the Schnelle.r v.
Hayes case. The court in the latter case, regardless
of its discussion of the distinction, brought out in the
Meuer Steel Barrel case, still insisted that even at law
a contract such as this would be without sufficient consideration. Here is the court's l'anguage :
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But if \Ye a~su1ne the contraet of the parties
to be bilateral and based upon 1nutual executory promises, appellant \Yonld not bP entitled to
injunctiYe relief. ....-\.ppellant 's prornise of ernploynlent could be terminated at his pleasure,
and \Yould not be a sufficient consideration fur
the promise of the respondent.''
d

The annotation in 9 . .\.L·.R. at page 1481 rnakes
reference to the case of Gilbert ·v. lV ilmer as follows :
'·In Gilbert Y. ,.Vilmer ( 1918), 102 Misc. 388,
168 X.Y. Supp. 1043, injunction \Yas denied to
restrain the breach of a covenant of this character, on the ground that the provisions -vvere
too inequitable to justify a court of equity in
enforcing it, the agreement in effect binding the
employee to \York as a window cleaner for the
plaintiff as such places and in such manner as
he \vas directed, his employment to continue as
long as he gave satisfaction, the employer being
the sole judge of the character of the work. The
court pointed out that the plaintiff could have
discharged the defendant after one hour's service, and according to the plaintiff's con-struction
of the contract, the defendant would have been
prevented from working at his business as windovv cleaner in that city for the period of one
year.''
.And see Oppenheimer v. Hirsch (1896), 5 App. Div.
232, 38 N.Y. Sup·p. 311, as referred to in 9 A.L.R. at
page 1475 vvhere the court considered the fact that the
employer reserved the right to discharge the employee
within a v-r-eek after he began his employment as a
further ground for refusing to enjoin the breach of the
employees negative covenant. See also Ridley v. Krout,
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(1947), 63 Wyo. 252, 180 Pac. 2d 124, Iron City Laundry
Company v. Leyton (1913), 55 Pa. Super Ct. 93, 9
A.L.R. at page 1481, and Smith Baking Co. v. Behrens
(1933), 125 Neb. 718, 251 N.W. 826.
That there is a lack of consideration in these cases
is supported by the case of May v. Lee (1930), (Tex. Cir.
App.), 28 S. W. 2d 202. In this case the defendant in
the injunction suit had gone to work for plaintiff as an
engineer under a contract which gave either party the
right to terminate at will and which restricted defendant from working for any of plaintiff's clients within
one year after termination. In holding that the negative
covenant was unenforceable because of lack of consideration and mutuality, the court said:
''After finishing his work for ·appellant with
Clarke & Courts, appellee elected to quit the
service of appellant, and two and one-half months
thereafter entered the service of Clarke & Courts.
The contract, except in so far as it was executed,
is, we think, an unilateral agreement, ·and there
being no consideration for the performance by
appellee of the unexecuted provisions of the
contract, such provisions cannot be enforced
against him.

* *
"This agreement furnishes an apt illustration of an unil'a.teral contract which is unenforceable by either party, except to the extent it has
been executed. Appellant was bound to pay
appellee the amounts specified in the agreement
for the services rendered by appellee, and, so
long as appellee continued in the service of appellant, he wa.s bound to properly perform his
*
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work and to further the intPrPst of appellant.
But when the execution of the contract ceased,
its unilateral charaeter rendered its unexecuted
portion unenforceable for lack of considera. • • • • ''
t lOll

In the principal case where the employer's promise \Yas terminable at \viii, \Ye have the added fact
that it \Yas the employer \vho terminated the employment, not the en1ployee. It is submitted that this should
be considered seriously in determining whether or not
the negative covenant is enforceable. In other words,
the contract not only lacked sufficient consideration,
but also there \Yas not sufficient performance on the
part of defendant to justify the enforcement of the restriction. The inverse of this is illustrated in the case
of Clark Paper ~ Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher (1919), 108
Misc. 399, 177 N.Y. Supp. 614, Affirmed in (1920) 193
App. Div. 924, 184 N.Y. Supp. 914, where the court
granted an injunction on the ground that the employee
had enjoyed several years of employment and voluntarily terminated, but stated that the situation would be
different had .the employee been fired before he had
worked a length of time commensurate with the term
of the restriction.
In fact a premature termination by the employer
has in some cases been considered a breach of the contract by the employer, and for that reason, the courts
have refused to grant an injunction agajnst the employer. In Economy ~Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy
(1935), 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E .747, the contract of employment was terminable at the will of either party, and
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after fifteen months the employer discharged the employee without cause. The court considered such action
arbitrary and unreasonable and as a failure of performance such as to make the employer's appearance in
court without clean hands, arn.d an injunction was refused,. See also D·utch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher
(1942) 58 Wyo. 374, 131 Pac. 2d 630.
In the principal case plaintiff has shown that defendant pharmacy employed him under the contract for
the specific purpose of building up a good business and
trade at said pharmacy and that he, as any reasonable
person would, believed that his employment would extend for as long as his work was satisfactory. Then, to
be arbitrarily discharged smacks of breach of contract and certainly places defendant in a poor position
to seek to enforce the negative covenant.
As is admitted by the respondent in its brief,
page 13, plaintiff was not a mere ''soda jerk'' or clerk.
Plaintiff was to act not only as a pharmacist but also
as a manager and in addition, he was to acquire a proprietary interest in the business itself through a stockbonus program. But until there were profits the promise was a mere incentive-a hope. The plaintiff called
upon all of his managerial ability and labored long
hours, and as shown by the evidence there was a net
profit within six or seven months. N·ow the hope could
materialize' 1into stock. Shortly after this position was
gained the defendant dismissed the plaintiff without
cause, thereby denying him from realizing this expected
benefit and fruits of his work. This type of future
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promise has been called a '' sPdnetiYe promise.'' In the
case of Super 1llaid Cook- TJTa re C'orp. v. H luuil, 50 Fed.
2d 830, the court stated:
·" ''Tithout guaranteeing to the defendants one
day ~s regular "~ork, \Yithout the obligation of
the appellant to en1ploy then1 or pay them anything, upon a seductiYe promise of the disclosure of inforn1ation upon \vhich they may hope
to build a profitable line of sales, the appellees
are induced to sign a paper 'vhich, while it has
the general appearance of a contract, but keeps
the promise to the ear "\vhile it breaks it to the
hope. Such a contract, wanting in mutuality,
presenting no equitable considerations, a court of
equity will not enforce.''
The contract under consideration here does not guarantee the employee one day's regular work. It does guarantee him 30 days' notice of termination which indirectly assures him of not less than 30 days work. To
discharge the plaintiff without cause, in view of the
circumstances already discussed, is to keep ''the promise to the ear while it breaks it to the hope.''
The "seductive promise'' type of case is distinct
and separate from the two types of cases cited by the
defendant, i.e., one type involving the usual employeremployee relationship where the employee leaves of
his own free will, and often with ulterior motives, or
where the employee is discharged for cause.
The case ·of Ridley v. Krout, 180 P2 124 (Wyo.)
(1947), cited by the defendant, recognized the distinction, citing as support the Super Maid Cook-Ware
case among others :
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"A number of courts have held that in cases
in which an employee is not guaranteed employment for any great length of time, as for
instance, when he may be dismissed on short
notice, the contract not to go into competitive
business thereafter has been held to be void.
Dockstader v. Reed, 121 App. Div. 846, 106
N.Y.S. 795; Gilbert v. Wilmer, 102 Misc. 388, 168
N.Y.S. 1043; Iron City Laundry Co. v. Leyton,
55 Pa. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp. v. Hamil,
5 Cir., 50 F. 2d 830; Schneller v. Hayes, 176
Wash. 115, 28 P 2d 273; Love v. Miami Laundry
Co., 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32; Byram v. Vaughn,
D.C., 68 F. Supp. 981; May v. Lee, Tex. Civ.
App., 28 S.W. 2d 202."
In 1946 the District Court for the District of
Columbia had an opportunity in Byram v. V aug'J'bn, 68
F. Supp. 981, to consider this type of case. In denying
the injunction, the above passage from the Super Maid
Cook-Ware case was quoted and approved. The discussion by the court of this doctrine is particularly illuminating and applicable hereto.
''An employer, who seeks to subject a former
employee to such severe and drastic restrictions
on his activities, should at least extend to him
some assurance of financial security for a reasonable time. Otherwise, the employee may find
himself completely at his employer's mercy.
Such a result would seem inequitable and at
times even contrary to the dictates of humanity.
One who seeks to restrict another's freedom of
action, should be willing to surrender his own
independence to .a corresponding degree. If the
employer prefers to leave himself free to terminate the employment at will in his own discre-
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tion, he should not be ~H-~corded the drastic and
far reaching ren1edy by w·ay of an injunction to
enforce a stipulation that would exclude the
former employee from an opportunity freely
to engage in the same business. ''

III.
IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO CASES CITED BY
APPELLANT PLAINTIFF HEREIN ACQUIRED NO TRADE
SECRETS.

The plaintiff's serVIces and the defendant's business are not of such a character as would involve the
acquisition of special business secrets. The people
come to a drugstore to trade. The store does not go to
to them or in any way solicit personal orders. The socalled trade secrets listed by the defendant do not in
any way come under the legal definition of such and
surely are not analogous to any protected by the courts
m any of the cases cited by the defendant. R:idley v.
Krout} supra, states:
''A process commonly known in the trade
is not a trade secret and will not be protected by
an injunction, a trade secret being a tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary
to- confide it.'' Victor Chemical Works v .Iliff,
299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806, 811; Process Laundry
Co., 208 Ky. 248; Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 132 N.Y. 2'64.
''If a so-called secret process is known to
others in the trade, no one will be enjoined from
using it. '' Hopkins on Unfair Trade, p. 158.
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"Trade secrets may not be construed as consisting of knowledge and efficiency which defendant obtained or procured through his experience.'' Inboden v. L. W. Hawker, Ohio App.,
41 N.E. 2d 271, 277.
The pharmaceutical prescriptions are not the
store's secrets but are brought to each store by the
customer and could in no way be transferred to a competitor. There is nothing secret about the ingredients
us-ed; in fact Section 78-12-15, Utah Code Annotated
1943, 79-12-15, provides that every drugstore shall provide itself with the latest edition of the United States
Pharmacopreia and National Formul'ary which list the
standard strength, quality and purity of all preparations
sold or dispensed and Section 79-12-16 provides that
unless otherwise prescribed for or specified by the
customer all pharmaceutical preparations should be according to the specifications listed in this book. The
narcotic records are records that are required by federal regulations and past records surely would not be
of value to a competitor even if the plaintiff had them
in his poss-ession, which he does not. There were no ·
methods of buying that could be considered secrets as
the store was new and any methods used were, and are,
the plaintiff's. Credit programs and mark up certainly
are not of a secretive nature; if they were, there would
be no use for them. Trade preferences are granted to
each store and could not be transferred by an employee
to a competitor. Hence, there is no alternative but to
proceed on the conclusion that there is nothing in this
case that could be ca tagorized as ''trade secrets.''
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The defendant says thnt the plaintiff \\Tas ~'not a
mere ·soda jerk' or clerk'' and surely this is so. He
\Yas, and has al,Yays been represented as such, a manager. But the plaintiff did not acquire ·a.ny trade secrets
in that capacity.
In J(aunzagraph Co. l'. Sta1npagraph ·Co. (1921),
197 . A.pp. DiY. 66, 188 N.Y. Supp 678 the Court refused to enjoin defendants from engaging in the die and
printing business notwithstanding when employed by
plaintiff they agreed never to do so. The court insists
that for such negative covenant to be enforceable, the
employee must have had an opportunity to learn certain trade secrets. Here is the language of the Court:
"Covenants ancillary to a contract of employment restricting the employees' right to
labor along the same line, either for themselves or others, upon the termination of their
employment, are not favored by the law, and
will not be enforced, unless there are special
circumstances that render the restriction a reasonable protection to the employer's business, to
prevent the employee from using knowledge that
he has acquired in the course of his employment, of the secrets of the trade, methods, or
processes of the employer. If the covenant, taking these circumstances into consideration, is not
more extensive as to time or space than will
afford a reasonable protection to the employer's
business, it will be enforced . . . . Where, however, the employee brings to the employment
skill previously acquired, and does not obtain,
in the course of his employment, knowledge of
methods and processes which are exclusively
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within his employer's cont.rol and right to use,
it cannot be said that such a restraint is reasonably necessary to the employer's protection.''
(Italics added)
And in the Sam;uel Stores v. Abrams, supra, in
determining that the terms of the covenant were unreasonable and against public policy, the court says the
following: .
''This stipulation provides, in effect, that the
defendant, for five years after he leaves the
employ of the plaintiff, shall not either directly
or indirectly connect himself with any firm engaged in business of the plaintiff in any city
where the plaintiff conducts one of its branch
stores.
"It appears from the complaint that the
services of the defendant contracted for by the
plaintiff are ·not peculiar or individual in their
~haracter, nor purely intellectual, nor are they
special or extraordinary services or acts.
"The defendant's services and the plaintiff's
business are not of a character to involve the
acquisition of special business secrets of the
plaintiff by the defendant. The agreement relates merely to services in a local retail business, and primarily aims to restrict competition.
' ' The plain tiff conducts a local retail clothing
business in which the defendant was employed
as manager. The situation of manager could
have been filled by any person of sufficient business capacity."
A distinction must be m~ade between a case where
an employee comes into an established business green
and learns trade secrets and trade practices, and the
trained employee who brings to a new business his pro-
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fessional experience as 'vas done in the principal case.
The plaintiff here had liYed in the coininunity for more
than a year before g·oing to 'vork for defendant as the
evidence sho,Ys, and a good share of the patronage and
clientele of the drugstore consisted of friends and acquaintances of plaintiff and his wife. Furthermore, the
fact that plaintiff may have gained a personal influence
over other customers is not reason for holding this
covenant enforceable. In Ridley v. Krout, (1947), 63
\\ryo. 252, 180 P2 124, the recent Wyoming case above
cited in discussing this same problem said:
''Everyone who lives any length of time in
any community, as an employee, is bound to make
acquaintances and friends and if that mere fact
would authorize an injunction such as prayed
herein we fear, as stated in Club Aluminum Co.
v. Young, supra (363 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804)
there would be left but ''a shadow of the general
rule against the validity of restrictive covenants
upon individual liberty of action as to one's trade
or calling, and would establish in its stead what
has hitherto been treated as an exception." The
court in Love v. Miami Laundry Co., supra (118
Fla. 137, 160 So. 32) stated in connection with
the driver of a laundry truck that the employer
.acqUired no property interest in the former's
God given or self cultivated, ingratiating personality. * * * * There is also some testimony of
personal solicitation on his part. The su·m and
substance of 'that testimony as we read it is that
he solicited business from former cutomers of
his own and from people he had known all his
life. Defendant at the time of trial of this case
was 52 years old and he stated he had lived in
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Sheridan all his life. He had engaged in the
repairing of bicycles and automobiles before
entering the services of the plaintiff.''
Appellant cites the following 7 cases to show the
enforcement of negative covenants where they are necessary to protect the employer against the employee's
use of trade secrets. The factual situations are a far
cry from the one in issue; the main discrepancy that
in all cases where the covenant is enforced there were
true trade secrets which in the hands of a competitor
would harm the employer. The type of businesses involved in these cases are those that actively solicit cu~
tomers outside their main offices, while in the case at
hand the customers themselves contact the drugstore.
Even with these aggravating conditions the courts refused to enforce the negative covenants in 4 of the 7
cited cases. Also, in 6 cases the employee voluntarily
left the employment and in the 7th he was fired because
of intemperate habits.

Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 151 A. 617, 'appellant's brief page 13, held that employment alone is
sufficient consideration where the employee gains knowledge of business methods and secrets the disclosure
of which to a rival would r,esult in irreparable injury
to the employer. The secrets here were actually unique and secret methods used by the employer in his
laundry business. The employee was floor supervisor
in the float-iron department and the company had recently expended $20,000 in employing these new methods
and processes of which he knew. H,e voluntarily left
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the employer ·'s laundry to \York for a con1petitor to
""hom kno\Yledge of these secrets \Yonld be valuable to
the detriment of his employer. So the detern1ining factors here \Yere the actual trade secrets, e1nployee
voluntarily lea.Ying, and an elen1ent of bad faith, all of
\Yhich are absent in the case under consideration.
The court refused to enforce the negative covenant in Bond Electric Corpora.tion v. Keller, 166 A. 341,
appellant's brief p. 13, even though it vvas a contract
($3,000 if he \Youldn 't disclose any knowledge of trade
customers or policies nor work for competitors) that
\Yas made after termination of employment. The language ·of the court could be applied to the instant case
as they said :
"A contract, the sole object of which is to restrain competition is void as in restraint of
trade .... No restraint of trade can be enforced
unless the covenant is merely ancillary to the
main purpose of the main contract and necessary
to protect the employer in the enjoyment of the
legitimate fruits of the contract or to protect
him from the dangers of the unjust use of those
fruits by the other party.''
The covenant in this case fits perfectly under this statement as it is not ancillary to the main purpose of the
contract and is not made to protect the employer from
the disclosure of any trade secrets but is pure restraint of trade. If $3,000 is insufficient consideration,
surely the court will not in this case find that mere employment, without disclosure of trade secrets is sufficient consideration.
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The Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Co., 179,
N.Y.S., 325, appellant's brief p. 13, case was later
reversed. Here there were true trade secrets involved
and the lower court granted the injunction. The
employer manufactured raw film products and employed chemists to perfect the processes which he
guarded and kept secret from competitors. The employee was given knowledge of these processes and
formulre and his agreement not to disclose them or compete with the employer when enforced by the court in
the first case. In the second Kodak case the court
held that the enforcement of the negative covenant was
not necessary for the protection of the employer (even
though secret processes were involved and also here
a competitor was offering higher wages to get him to
leave, but said that they would grant an injunction to
restrain the disclosure of secrets of manufacture only
and that they would not enforce the negative covenant
in the contract to stop him working for a competitor.
The employee voluntarily left and was not fired, and
the second defendant in the case was a competitor who
was trying to entice the employee away, impliedly because he wanted to gain these trade secrets. The strongest language of the court in the first Kodak case was:
''An employer can require as a part consideration of one being employed such agreement
as will properly protect his trade secrets.''
This is not applicable in our case, there being no
trade secrets involved. The plaintiff's contention is
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supported by the second Kodak case wherein the
court said:
""The common lR\V prohibited such contracts
and this rule has been modified only to a certain extent. ' '
The court also cited Strobridge Litho Co. v. Crane, 12,
N. Y. Supp. 898, 899, which held:
''As a general rule equity will not interfere
to restrain by injunction a violation of a restrictive covenant in relation to personal services.''
Then the court said that there are cases where the
covenant against entering the employ of another was
enforced, where the employee violated his contract by
leaving before the expiration of his employment, indicating that the moving cause for the enforcement was
the employee's violation of contract, which is a strong
equitable consideration not involved in the instant case.
In the Davey Tree 'Exp-ert Co. v. Black, 244 N.Y.S.
239, appellant's brief p. 14, case the employee had
obtained scientific and confidential information on tree
surgery through instructions given him by his employer. The agreement, which they held him to, was
that he would not work for another within a year
after he severed his employment. Undoubtedly if the
employer had done the severing, as in our case, the
court would not have allowed the injunction.
The extenuating circumstances in Elbe File and
Binder Co. v. Fine, 242 N.Y.S. 632, are that the employee
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ployer and also became acquainted with real trade
secrets. Also, the employee was given a 3 year contract of employment which the court held was valid
consideration for the negative covenant saying:
''the period of time of employment without
fear of discharge at will of the employer constitutes sufficient consideration."
Also, further bad faith was shown when they proved
that the employee entered the contract believing the
covenant to be unenforceable.
In Stonemwn v. Wilson, 192 S.E. 816, ·appellant's
brief p. 14, the employee o\vned stock in the hardware
store in which he worked. The negative covenant was part
consideration for the selling of said stock. Further,
the employee was discharged for cause, namely intemperate habits. Even with all these circumstances the
court refused to enforce the injunction.

Chandler, Gardner & Williams v. Reynolds, 145
N.E. 476, 250 Mass. 309, cited on page 14 of appellant's brief, differs from this case because there the
court found that the employer had sufficient cause
to discharge the employee because he refused, failed
and neglected to properly perform his work. Moreover,
the employer agreed to teach the employee its secret
methods of embalming and one of the purposes of the
contract was to prevent the employee from taking
advantage of this given knowledge. There was no
teaching by the defendant of secret methods to use
in the drug store, the plaintiff being in full charge.
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. A. nother exan1ple ""here the en1ployee \Yas disndssed

for cause, cited by defendant, is lT'ahlgren v. Barusch
<-S· Lonl,b Optical Co., C.C ...:-\. Ill., 68 F. 2d 6'60, affiriuing,
D. C., Bausch <-S· Lonz.b Optical Co. v. 1Vahlgren, 1 F.
Supp. 799. There \Yas evidence of an unauthorized
taking of n1oney by the employee and the employer had
asked for the employee's resignation due to such conduct and personal habits detrimental to the employer's
interests. There \Yas also evidence of a general connivance to leave the business of his employer and enter
into a competing business. The court said:
''We conclude that the master was justified
in finding Oscar (defendant in the case) was one
of the co-conspirators in the unlawful enterprise
which was conceived by his brother in violation
of that gentleman's written agreement."
The court in justifying its decision spoke of attempts
to conspire to wrongfully injure the employer's business and of an "enticing away", all of which are
elements of bad faith on the employee's part which
are entirely lacking in our case.
~Once again in Tolman Laundry Co. v. Walker, 187
A. 836, 838, 171 Md. 7, appellant's brief p·. 15, the
employee ''. . . voluntarily severed his- connection with
the laundry p-ursuant to a provision in his contract."
The court said :
''The testimony is conclusive that when the
defendant severed his relation with his master
on Aug. 17, 1935, he became the servant of
another corporation which was engaged in the
same business as his former master.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
The appellant cites at page 15 Durbow Commission
Co. v. Donner, 229 N.W. 635, 201 Wis. 175. The defendant in this case demurred to the complaint asking
for an injunction and the court overruled the demurrer.
Although the court discussed the general law, the case
only held that the demurrer to the complaint should
have been sustained on the basis that the plaintiff
had not pleaded sufficient facts.

Eigelbach ·v. Boone Loan and Investment Company,
287 S.W. 225, appellant's brief p. 15, can be distinguished from the case in issue in that the employee
voluntarily left the employer's service and was not
summarily discharged 'after having been led to believe his
employment was of a permanent nature as the plaintiff
was in this case. Also, there was a true trade secret
involved in the cited case. The defendant had a
customer list in his possession through which a competing loan company -could make contacts. A loan
company solicits customers whereas the customers come
to a drug store and the store does not go to them.
When an employee of a clothing business took with
him customer lists, statistical data, and records which
had been collected at great expense to the employer,
the court in M oskrin Bros. Inc. v. Swartzberg, 155 S.E.
154, 199 N.C. 539, appellant's brief p. 15, the court
prevented him from injuring his former employer by
working for a competitor.
In Grmnd Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 195 N.E. 277,
203 Ind. 245, 98 A.L.R. 958, appellant's brief p. 15, although the court discussed several of its own deci-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
sions dealing 'Yith injunctions "There t?e sale of a
business had been inYolved, the court noted that they
had never decided a case involving the employerenlployee relationship; consequently they turned to the
decisions of other jurisdictions. The court relied on
seYeral rases but quoted rather extensively from two.
They said the rase of Deverling v. City Baking Cornpa;n,y (1928), 155 ~fd. 280, 141 A. 542, 545, 67 A.L.R.
993, involved Yery similar facts to the case in the decision. In that case the employee left the employment
of the company and within a few days entered the
employment of a competing company. The court then
noted that this \\~as a case where the employee violated
the negative covenant in order to sell his services to
a competitor at a higher wage. The other case was
the Chandler case, supra, and ·as already noted the
employee was fired for cause and moreover the employer had instructed him in his own secrets of embalming as a part of his employment.
The court held in May v. Young, 2 Atl. 2d 385,
appellant's brief p. 15, that unless they enforced the
negative covenant the employee would be .making use
of his knowledge acquired during his employment to
the detriment of his employer. But in this case it
involved an engineering firm and the employee had
in his possession a confidential list of clients the firm
contacted, a list of prospective clients and confidential records ; none of which exist in the instant case.
The court granted an injunction in the case of
Granger v. Craven, 52 A.L.R. 1356, appellant's brief
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p. 16, but here they were dealing with the unique profession of doctoring. The employee was hired as an
assistant to an established doctor. The court repeatedly
emphasized that the reason for enforcing such an
injunction in this case was because of the confidential
relationship existing between a doctor and his patients
and the fact that the patients treated by the employee
would be so likely to follow him to a new location.
A drugtsore manager cannot in any way be compared
to a doctor and his patients in that the drugstore
customers do not buy his knowledge and advice but
his products. The court pointed out a doctor's professional status by using such phrases as:
'' . . . a professional man . . . giving the other
access to the confidence of his clients . . . and
would attract a number of the employer's patients . . . .
''A specialist may be presumed to acquire
as firm a hold upon patients as the drivers of
a laundry wagon.· . . . Different conditions attend professional employment from those which
go with the more conventional relation of master and servant.''
The reasons for the court's decision of granting
an injunction in Davvey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein,
25 S.W. 2d 62, 233 Ky. 115, appellant's brief p. 16,
are obvious when the factual situation is noted. The
employee received a three month course of instruction from the employer in the art or science of tree
surgery and was paid during this period of instruction. Soon after that the employee voluntarily left
the employer's business and went into a competing
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business for hin1self. The court also pointed out that
he left "~ithout justification.
In Hydra-ulic P·ress Jllfg. Co. v. Lake Erie Engineering Corp, et al. (1942), 2nd Circuit, 132 Fed. 403,
the situation is son1ew·hat similar to that in the instant
case except that the employee vras hired as a designing engineer rather than as a pharmacist and manager
of a drug store. His \York consisted of designing
hydraulic presses. He \vas under the supervision of
the head engineer. He exercised his own talents and
ingenuity and had access to the files of the plaintiff
and all its engineering data and methods of practice.
It was held that the lower court properly found that
the employee was not in possession of any trade secrets
belonging to the plaintiff and further that the nature
of his employment with the plaintiff did not make it
reasonably necessary for the protection of plaintiff in
its business to restrict him from entering the employ
of plaintiff's competitors after leaving plaintiff's employment. The court said that this situation must not
be confused with the situation of that of a salesman
"whose acquaintance and personal relationships with
customers of the plaintiff might enable him to divert
their trade unfairly to a competitor."
.And in Roy v. Bolduc, supra, where it was held
that a real estate salesman's negative covenant was
unenforceable, the court said:
"It is accordingly held that while an employer, under a proper restrictive agreement can
prevent a former employee from using his trade
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or business secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of the employment,
and from enticing away old customers, he has
no right to unnecessarily interfere with the
employee's following any trade or calling for
which he is fitted and from which he may earn
his livelihood and he cannot preclude him from
exercising the skill and general knowledge he
has acquired or increased through experience or
even instructions while in the employment.''
Appellant cites at page 11 of its brief the recent
Utah case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks (1950),
------ U t. ______ , 225 Pac. 2d 739, which is not in point.
The courts have always differentiated between contracts involving the sale of business and their good
will and a contract which involves only an employeremployee relationship. In the latter case the courts
are more cautious in granting injunctions. Moreover,
this case is not in point for the further reason that
the question of the contract being an unreasonable
restraint of trade was not even raised by the appellant
in his brief nor was it considered by the court .
•

The court in the Valley Mortuary case was keenly
aware of the fact that the case involved the sale of
a business, stating:
''Furthermore, where an established business
has been sold with its good will and there is
a valid covenant not to compete in a certain
territory, the breach of such a covenant entitles
the injured party to injunctiv~ relief practically
as a rna tter of course. '' ( Citations omitted.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

This is the only situation considered by the court in
that case and it does not touch on the situation InvolYed here-the employer-employee relationship.

IV.
THE QUESTION OF ESTOPPEL CANNOT FIRST BE
RAISED ON APPEAL .

. A. ppellant 's argument that respondent is estopped

from attacking the negative covenant because of having
accepted benefits of the contract seems out of order
at this time. At no stage in the proceedings in the
lower court was the question raised. A failure to
assert a defense of nonperformance of a condition
precedent to bring suit cannot be urged for the first
time on appeal. 4 C.J.S. 448. This rule has been
applied to a lack of tender, Los Angeles Inv. Co. v.
Home Savings Bank of Los Angeles, 182 Pac. 293,
180 Cal. 601, 5 A.L.R. 1193. Furthermore, as a general
rule a party -cannot for the first time on appeal raise
the question of estoppel. 4 C.J.S. 451.
Appellant claims that respondent should have made
a tender to do equity. Would appellant require that
respondent return all the salary he received while
employed, or just the salary for the last 30 days during which time he was not required to report for work~
If the former, the claim is ridiculous, for appellant
received its quid pro quo for every bit of salary it
paid respondent up to the day he was asked not to
report back to work. If the latter, the claim is likewise ridiculous for the reason that it has nothing to
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do with this action fo1 a declaratory judgment. 2 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. 59, section 387
says that the maxim, "he who seeks equity must do
equity" does not apply where the relief sought by
the plaintiff and the equity sought by the defendant
belong to or grow out of two entirely separate ·and
distinct matters. Furthermore, according to Lawrence
on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1090, the maxim does
not require that the plaintiff tender any particular act,
or offer to do equity, though to incorporate such an
offer in a bill might be good practice.
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CO~CLUSION

Plaintiff accepted en1ployn1ent with defendant,
'Yent into an absolutely ne'Y store building and as
manager and pharu1acist for defendant stocked the
store and started the business. He had lived in the
neighborhood for over a year and had many friends
and acquaintances. These people, as well as friends of
the o'Yners of defendant pharmacy, to be sure, patronized the store. The fact that plaintiff's contract provided for his participation in the profits and other
things led him to believe his employment would be
comparatively permanent. After one year of operation
when the business was beginning to show a profit,
defendant discharged plaintiff for no reason .and without cause. Now defendant threatens to enforce a negative covenant that would restrict plaintiff from competing with defendant either as principal or employee
within a radius of two miles for five years. According
to the cases cited, said area is unreasonably large for
the reason that it is larger than is necessary to the
protection of the defendant. Furthermore, a five year
period of restriction is certainly not consistant with
his having worked there for just one year and a contract guaranteeing no more than 30 days employment
certainly lacks mutuality. To the unreasonableness of
these provisions, add the fact that plaintiff's covenant
was not supported by consideration and it will be
.evident that to restrict plaintiff from working in the
two mile area for five years would be a gross injustice.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48

For these reasons we urge the court to affirm the
judgment of the lower court which granted equitable
relief to the plaintiff in declaring that the said negative covenant is invalid and unenforceable.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. RICHARDS,
J. RICHARD BELL,
JACQUE BELL,
Attorneys for Plaintiff,

50 Richards Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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